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Testamentary Dispositions
H. Alston Johnson'
As readers of this symposium will already know from other articles
contained in it, the Louisiana State Law Institute proposed comprehensive
revisions to portions of Book II of the Civil Code relative to successions and
donations in Senate Bill 1379 introduced in the 1995 Regular Session of the
Louisiana Legislature. The bill did not pass, and it is envisioned that it will be
re-introduced in much the same form during the 1997 Regular Session of the
Louisiana Legislature. Hence these commentaries, designed to praise this work
where praise is deserved and to criticize constructively where such criticism
would be useful. All of this is done, of course, with the aim of improving the
final legislative product.
This particular portion ofthe symposium discusses the proposed changes in the
nature and content of testamentary dispositions.' The division of testamentary
dispositions into various categories is not simply an idle academic exercise. Some
very important issues may be resolved by the decision as to the nature of a given
legacy, such as priority ofpayment ofthe legacies in a testament, responsibility for
the debts ofthe deceased, and the proper allocation of lapsed legacies. Before we
begin that enterprise, however, some historical discussion is necessary; would a
commentary on proposals to amend the Civil Code be complete without it?
I. SOME HISTORY

It is well known that the present Civil Code divides legacies into those
which are deemed universal, those which are under universal title, and those
which are called particular legacies.' The proposed revision would roughly
approximate those three categories with legacies which are to be called residuary,
general, and particular,3 though with a few quite significant changes. The
present Civil Code categories oflegacies follow very closely the categories found
in the Code Napoleon when our drafters approached the task of writing the
Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825. However, there are a few
differences of note between the Code Napoleon categories and our own.

Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
'Adjunct Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Co-Reporter, Louisiana State Law
Institute project to revise Civil Code Book II relative to successions and donations, 1980.1984.
1. These changes were primarily contained in proposed Articles 1584 through 1604 of Senate
Bill 1379 of the 1995 Regular Session [hereinafter proposed La. Civ. Code arts.]. The bill is
reproduced in the Appendix to this Symposium at 57 La. L. Rev. 201.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 1605 outlines these three types of legacies. In turn, La. Civ. Code art.
1606 defines a universal legacy; La. Civ. Code art 1612 defines a legacy by universal title; and La.
Civ. Code art. 1625 "defines" a particular legacy, mostly by default, by stating that a particular
legacy is any legacy which is neither a universal legacy nor a legacy by universal title.
3. Proposed Article 1584 lists the three types of legacies; proposed Articles 1585, 1586 and 1587
define residuary, general, and particular legacies respectively.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

The general article introducing the categories of legacies in the Code
Napoleon was simple and straightforward, providing only that testamentary
dispositions were either universal, under universal title, or particular.4 The
Digest of 1808 essentially followed this formula, but divided testamentary
dispositions into an institution of heir on the one hand or legacies (in one of the
three categories) on the other.5 There were no substantive changes in the Codes
of 18256 and 1870.1
The definition ofuniversal legacy found in Article 1003 ofthe Code Napoleon
is functionally identical to that of the various articles of our Civil Code in its
development, and to the wording of Article 1606 in the present Civil Code. The
definition of a legacy by universal title in Article 1010 of the Code Napoleon is
virtually identical to that found in Article 1612 oftoday's Civil Code, and to that
which was found in Article 1604 of the Code of 1825. The redactors of the Digest
of 1808 had tried a slightly different formulation,' which they apparently
abandoned in returning to the Code Napoleon language in the Civil Code of 1825.
Finally, with respect to particular legacies, the drafters ofthe Code Napoleon had
more or less the same "default" provision that we find in Article 1625 today, i.e.,
that any legacy which is neither a universal legacy nor one under universal title is
a particular legacy.9 This is substantively identical to the provision that we now
have in Article 1625 of the Civil Code and which we had in Article 1618 of the
Code of 1825; but once again the drafters of the Digest of 1808 had hit upon a
slightly different idea which was jettisoned in 1825.°
All of the foregoing reveals that, with only minor deviations from time to
time, we have stayed very close to the categories originally outlined in the Code
Napoleon. This raises the rather obvious question of whether the changes now
proposed are simply change for change's sake, or whether there were serious
functional problems in the categories that could not be addressed without a
change in their definition. To this inquiry we now turn.

4. Code Napoleon art. 1002 provided: "Les dispositions, testamentaires sont ou universelles, ou
Stitre universel, ou Atitre particulier."
5. La. Digest of 1808 arts. i10, 113.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1598 (1825).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1605 (1870).
8. The French and English text versions of Article 115 of the Digest of 1808 contain different
fractional examples, but more importantly, state specifically that a legacy by universal title may be
given to one or more persons. While there is no doubt that a legacy by universal title may be given
to one or more persons under the present law, the concept is not specifically stated.
9. Code Napoleon art. 1010(2) provided: "Tout autre legs ne forme qu'une disposition Atitre
particulier."
10. Article 116 of the Digest of 1808 at least attempted to define a particular legacy in a way
different from simply stating that it was neither a universal legacy nor a legacy by universal title.
That article stated, in pertinent part, that a particular legacy was one "by which the testator gives to
one or several persons certain substances, as such a house, such a horse, his library, his ward robe;
or indeterminate things as a horse, a silver bason [sic) weighing so much; or a certain sum of money,
as a sum of ten thousand dollars; or a certain quantity, as ten puncheons of nun or a hundred banrls
of flour."
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II. DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF PROPOSED LEGACY CATEGORIES
The rough equivalent of a universal legacy is the "residuary" legacy, which
is defined in proposed Article 1585 as follows:
A residuary legacy is a disposition of all or a fraction of the entire
estate, or all or a fraction of the balance of the estate that remains after

deducting all general and particular legacies.
A residuary legacy may be made for the benefit of more than one
legatee without changing its nature, even though the testator has
assigned portions to the legatees.
This is a laudable attempt to address two different concepts, but it may not
have been completely successful. The first concept is that of the former
universal legacy: how shall we define a disposition that the testator intends shall
give the legatee "an eventual calling to the totality of the estate" as the cases
describe it? The important issue here is not so much what the testator has
actually given to the legatee, but what the testator intends for the legatee to take
in the event that certain other legacies lapse for whatever reason" or are
null. 2 The testator's intent, of course, is paramount; 3 but if he has been
unclear about whether a particular disposition should be considered universal, the
law may have to reach a conclusion about what he might have intended.
The present definition of a universal legacy in Louisiana Civil Code article
1606 is not wholly satisfactory on this point. It provides that a universal legacy
is a disposition "by which the testator gives to one or several persons the whole
of the property which he leaves at his decease." If one understands "the whole
of the property" which he leaves at death to mean "all property not otherwise
disposed of for whatever reason" and then focuses on an intent to vest one or
more individuals with the possibility of taking all such property, then the article
probably accomplishes its purpose. But if one understands this to be more
narrow, and to require that the testator state precisely that he wishes to bequeath
"all of his property" to an individual or individuals, then the category of
universal legacy is a good deal smaller.' 4

!1. The most common reason for a lapsed legacy would certainly be predecease of another
legatee, but renunciation might be another. See proposed Article 1589.
12. As in the case of a prohibited substitution. See La. Civ. Code art. 1520.
13. La. Civil Code art. 1712: "In the interpretation of acts of last will, the intention ofthe testator
must principally be endeavored to be ascertained, without departing, however, from the proper
signification of the terms of the testament."
14. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted in Succession of Burnside, 35 La. Ann. 708,
716 (1883): "The words of the code are not sacramental. It is not needful that a testamentary
bequest shall be couched in the identical language of the Code, and if it is essential to constitute a
universal legatee that all shall be given him without diminution, the only will by which such legatee
could be named would be one which contained that disposition and no other."
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For the most part, the cases have given this article the broader and more
useful meaning over the years. They have looked to the potential result of a
given legacy, and have inferred from that potential result (though perhaps not
actually achieved) an intent on the testator's part to favor that legatee with the
potential calling to the entirety of the estate.'" If the disposition is of the
disposable portion of the estate, that would be considered a universal legacy even
though there were forced heirs at the time it was written, since the forced heirs
might predecease the testator without issue. 6 If the disposition said simply "X
is my heir," the disposition would be considered universal even though it did not
actually dispose of property in the formal sense, since this should be considered
the rough approximation of the institution of an heir. 7
Thus, even in the absence of a specific foothold in present Article 1606, the
cases have respected the view of the French doctrinal writers and have
established that either the actual or potential calling to the entirety of the estate
is the essential element in determining whether a disposition is a universal
legacy. Unfortunately, the proposed article converting a universal legacy into a
"residual" legacy does not address this issue, and there does not appear to be any
reason why it should not do so. If the concept of a disposition of "a fraction
of the entire estate" is intended to express this notion, it could perhaps be
clarified.
The second concept which is at work here is that of a legacy of the
residuum. Whether a legacy of the "rest" or "residuum" of the testator's estate,
following other legacies, constitutes a universal legacy has proved to be a
troublesome issue for our courts. It seems clear at this point that a legacy of the
residuum. following a particular legacy is a universal legacy.' This conclusion
is reached largely by negative reasoning, i.e., since the testator did not assign a
specified part or fraction (such as in a legacy by universal title) elsewhere in the
testament, then he did not intend to limit the legatee of the residuum to any
given part or fraction. Thus, he must have intended that the legatee of the
residuum. could receive the entirety of the estate under certain circumstances.
It is less clear that the legacy of the residuum following a legacy by universal
title might constitute a universal legacy. By definition, the assignment of one
fraction (by universal title) leaves only another fraction to the legatee of the
residuum, thus limiting rather than potentially expanding the rights of that legatee
15. This was the standard enunciated by the court in Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob. 56 (La. 1845).
Applying that standard, the court concluded that a legacy which was effectively of three-fourt of
the property of the decedent could not be considered a universal legacy. In K. A. Cross, A Treatise
on Successions § 140, at 204 (1891). the author includes within his own definition of a universal
.legacy the concept that the disposition is of the whole of the property left at death "either actually,
or in eventual right."
16. 5 Marcel Planiol et George Ripert, Trait6 pratique de Droit Civil Frangais No. 614 (1933).
17. Id. The Code Napoleon did not recognize the concept of institution of heir known to Roman
law, but our redactors chose to carry the concept forward even though it came to have no particular
legal significance in our statutory scheme.
iS. Succession of Burnside, 35 La. Ann. 708 (1883).
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of the residuum and permitting the inference that the testator did not intend to

vest the residuary legatee with a potential calling to the entirety of the estate.
This has led to conclusions in the cases that the legacy ofthe residuum following
a legacy by universal title is not a universal legacy. 9
The commingling of the concepts of residuary legacies and universal
legacies in the cases decided under present Article 1606 has puzzled lawyers and
judges alike."0 Properly understood, neither concept determines the other. A
residuary legacy is not necessarily universal, or by universal title, or by particular
title. The term "residuary legacy" refers to its content, not its nature; it is largely
a shorthand way for the testator to deal with large portions of his property

without specifically identifying them. By the same token, a universal legacy
need not be of the residuum and probably need not actually dispose of any
property in itself. In fact, a testator could create a universal legacy simply by

saying: "X is my universal legatee, to receive whatever legacies lapse for
whatever reason."
To its credit, the proposed article attempts to resolve this lack of clarity by
providing specifically that a "residuary" legacy may be one that is of all or a
fraction of the balance of the estate that remains after deducting all "general and
particular legacies." But here again, the essential nature of the legacy is its
universality, not its residuary character; the change of terminology may foster
confusion rather than the clarity which it seeks.
The second paragraph of the proposed article tackles another problem, and
that is whether a legacy now to be called "residuary" (i.e., universal) ceases to
be so when it is made to more than one person and the testator "has assigned
portions to the legatees." This introduces the debate over the controversial
decision in Succession of Lambert,2 ironically celebrating its fiftieth birthday
as this symposium is written. The comments to the proposed article state that
the second paragraph is intended to "revise" the jurisprudential rule of Lambert,
but this is not entirely accurate. In the first place, Lambert did not present an
issue of whether a given legacy was universal; rather, it addressed the issue of
whether a given legacy should be considered conjoint and thus whether
testamentary accretion should occur in favor ofthe surviving co-legatee when the
other legatee had predeceased the testator.' Thereafter, the cases appeared to
follow Lambert when the issue was actually one of lack of conjointness vel non

19. The opinions in Succession of Dougart, 30 La. Ann. 268 (1878) and Compton v. Prescott, 12
Rob. 56 (La. 1845) probably stand for this proposition.
20. See generally Hopson v. Ratliff, 426 So. 2d 1377 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
21. 210 La. 636, 28 So. 2d 1 (1946).
22. As all students of Louisiana succession law are aware, the testator in Lambert made a
disposition of the residuum of his estate to "my brothers Robert and Albert share and share alike."
Albert had in fact predeceased the testator, and the issue was whether Robert was entitled to take the
entire legacy of the residuum due to testamentary accretion. A disfavored brother (William) and
Albert's son (Albert, Jr.) successfully argued that the legacy was not conjoint; no accretion could
occur;, and half of the legacy should descend intestate, partially to them and partially to the favored,
surviving brother.
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and testamentary accretion, ' but may not have followed it when the issue was
universality of a disposition and none of the legatees to whom a portion was
assigned had predeceased the testator. 4 The net effect of the second paragraph
of the proposed article is probably to confirm and codify the case law that holds
that assignment of parts within a legacy otherwise universal in nature does not
destroy its universality, but the actual holding in Lambert as to conjointness and
testamentary accretion is unaffected by the paragraph. About this more later, but
Lambert probably should have also been repudiated as to conjointness and
testamentary accretion, as well as with respect to the universality of legacies.
The second category of legacies is proposed to be known as "general," the
rough equivalent of legacies by universal title in the present Civil Code. Here,
unlike the substitution of the word "residuary" for "universal" in the present
scheme discussed above, there is a substantive change in the law. Proposed Article
1586 provides: "A general legacy is a disposition of all, a fraction, or the balance
of property expressly described by the testator as one of the following categories:
separate or community property, movable or immovable property,
or corporeal or
26
incorporeal property. This list of categories is exclusive.
There is probably more change in the law here than meets the eye. The first
is that the categories are "exclusive," presumably meaning that only those
dispositions specifically listed can be considered "general" and thus potentially
narrowing the scope of this category. Present Article 1612 is probably broader,
including within legacies by universal title any legacy which is expressed as a
"proportion" of one's disposable property and then giving examples ("as a half, a
third, or all his immovables, or all his movables, or a fixed proportion of all his
immovables or of all his movables"). The present article does not appear to place
property into categories, but rather expresses the general proposition that it is the

assigning of a fraction or a proportion among all disposable property that makes a
legacy one under universal title, regardless of the nature of the property.
The comments to the proposed article also express the view that the law will

be changed by its enactment because it provides that a legacy ofall or a portion of
the testator's separate or community property is a general legacy and "such
dispositions were not legacies under universal title under prior law."27 No
authority is cited for the latter statement, and there does not appear to be any
jurisprudential authority for it. Whether it is a viable extrapolation from the present
article is of course open to debate, but since the present article is illustrative rather
than exclusive, it is difficult to see how the statement can be correct. If a testator
gives "the proportion of my immovable property which is my separate property"

23. Succession of McCarron, 247 La. 419, 172 So. 2d 63 (1965).
24. Gregory v. Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950).
25. Lambert was not universally popular (pun intended) when it was first decided. Chief Justice
O'Niell wrote not one or two, but three dissents in the case--the only instance known to the writer
in which one justice wrote three dissents in the same case.
26. Proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1586.
27. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1586 cmt. a.
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to a legatee, it seems that would fit the definition ofa legacy by universal title under
the present article; it gives a "certain proportion" of the testator's immovable
property to the legatee.
Another comment expresses the view that a legacy of "one-fourth of my
property" would not be a general legacy under the proposed article because such
a legacy is not within the exclusive listing.2" But a legacy of one-fourth of a
subset ofthe entire property, such as "one fourth ofall my immovables," would be
a "general" legacy under the same comment. It will probably take some time to
educate Louisiana lawyers to the notion that the assignment of a fraction of a
smaller subset of the patrimony is "general" but giving a fraction ofthe larger set
(and without any specificity as to the items ofproperty) is not "general" but rather
is "particular."
The exclusivity ofthe article may prove difficult to administer. In order to fit
within the article, the legacy must be "expressly described" by the testator "as one
of the following categories." Most persons who write wills without legal assistance
(and indeed some of those who do) will not be totally familiar with all of these
terms. What if the testatrix says "I leave all of my unimproved real estate to X"?
This is arguably a "fraction" of her "immovable property," but she has not
"expressly described" the category as "immovable property."
The third category of legacies seems substantively unchanged, though it
laudably adopts the more common name of such legacies as "particular legacies"
rather than the more cumbersome "legacies by particular title" used in present
Article 1625. The proposed article continues the practice, however, of "defining"
particular legacies by default: "A legacy that is neither general nor residuary is a
particular legacy." 29
Comment (b) to the proposed article correctly observes that the assignment of
parts in a particular legacy does not affect its classification as a particular legacy.
But one wonders why this statement was confined to the comments under proposed
Article 1587, but was thought worthy of a paragraph in the main text of Article
1585, expressing the same concept as to a residuary legacy. The treatment
probably needs to be harmonized: comments both places, or main text both places.
The fact that the proposed categories provoke so much thought and discussion
(albeit not necessarily as erudite as the work of the redactors) should give us some
pause. Is it worth the certain confusion among lawyers and judges when the
terminology and content change? That there are some problems with the
interpretations ofthe present categories cannot be gainsaid, but this is really not the
central issue in this effort. The central issue is whether the problems can only be
solved by changing the names and definitions ofthe categories of legacies.

28. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1586 cmt. b.
29. Comment (a) to proposed Article 1587, as Senate Bill 1379 was introduced, stated that the
article did not define a particular legacy in the negative by providing that it is not either one of the
other two types of legacies but rather "provides a positive definition." This comment must have been
written for a earlier version of the proposed article, because it does not fit the version in the
introduced bill. This needs correction.
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Ill. JOINT OR SEPARATE LEGACIES: HEREIN OF LAPSE AND ACCRETION
The revision addresses the nettlesome issue of the joint or separate nature of
a legacy in several places, beginning with proposed Article 1588: "A legacy to
more than one person is either joint or separate. It is separate when the testator
assigns shares and joint when he does not. Nevertheless, the testator may make a
legacy joint or separate by expressly designating it as such."30
This is plain enough: if the testator calls a legacy to more than one person
"joint," then it is joint regardless of whatever else he may do. If he says "I leave
Greenacre jointly to A and B, one-half to each," then presumably the legacy will
be considered joint, not separate, under this article. This probably restores our law
to what it was prior to the controversial decision in Succession of Lambert,3'
discussed earlier. The additional language after the dispositive portion of the
legacy is regarded as surplusage, doing only what the law would accomplish
anyway and thus having no other legal consequence. The difference is that by the
insertion of the word "jointly" in the hypothetical legacy, the testator presumably
may protect himself against a decision such as Lambert, which treated a legacy
without that word as not joint because of the additional language at the end.
But what if the testator should write "I leave Greenacre to A and B, one-half
to each"? The spectre of Lambert is still present. The article would permit the
conclusion on the continuing authority ofLambert that this is a separate rather than
joint legacy. 2 With the continuation of the principle that upon the predecease of
one ofthese two legatees, the share that would have been the predeceased's does
not belong to the other if the legacy was separate,33 the result will be that
Greenacre does not belong entirely to the surviving legatee. While one can never
know with certainty, this may not have been the testator's intent. The timidity with
which the drafters approach Lambertis puzzling. It was itself the reversal ofabout
a century ofjurisprudence; why should it be entitled to such deference? Would it
not be preferable to provide that if a legacy is given to more than one person, it is
presumed to be joint? Testators who write without legal assistance will no doubt
add "sharing" language, but it could be disregarded as it was pre-Lambert.

30. The proposal jettisons the word "conjoint" used in the present articles with the comment that

the change is intended to "highlight the fact that new rules have been adopted" and to avoid the
possibility that use of the old term with the new concept would "lead lawyers or judges into error."
There is, ofcourse, no magic to the word "conjoint." The word "conjoint" itself was simply an effort
to translate the French word "conjointement" which had been used in the version of the article in the
Code Napoleon, the Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825.
31. 210 La. 636, 28 So. 2d 1 (1946).
32. Indeed, it might be argued that the revision enhances the authority of Lambert in this instance
rather than diminishes it. By offering the testator the possibility of "overruling" Lambert or at least
avoiding it by the use of the word "joint," could it be said that adisposition which fails to use "joint"
is clearly governed by Lambert?
33. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1592: "When a legacy to ajoint legatee lapses, accretion
takes place ratably in favor of the other joint legatees, except as provided in the following Article."
The following article is an anti.lapse provision applicable within certain familial relationships.
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Testators who write with legal assistance and wish to have such a legacy considered
separate could simply write a vulgar substitution: "Ileave Greenacre to A and B.
Should B predecease me, I leave his portion to C." The person providing legal
assistance would know that with respect to any legacy to more than one person, the
testator should be asked the simple question of what he wants to happen if one of
those persons should predecease him. He could be told, in addition, that given that
he is leaving property to multiple persons, the law will presume that he wants them
to share it in the event of predecease of one among them; and that if he wants a
different result, he is free to provide for it.
This would indubitably eliminate considerable jurisprudential debate about the
extent to which Lambert survives this revision. The proposal appears to trim its
wings significantly, but declines the opportunity to repudiate it completely. The

cleaner approach would be to write provisions to overrule it,", restoring the
presumption ofjointness in a legacy to multiple persons and permitting a testator
to overcome the presumption with clear and unequivocal language."
One other situation of a conjoint legacy under the present law appears to go
without treatment in the revision, however, and this omission should probably be
addressed in some way. After the declaration in present Article 1707 that a legacy
to multiple legatees is conjoint unless parts are assigned, present Article 1708 also
provides that a legacy is conjoint "when a thing, not susceptible of being divided
without deterioration, has been given by the same act to several persons, even
separately." The writer has always believed that this referred to a situation in
which, on the first page ofa testament, the testatrix gives "the house on July Street"
to A and then on the second page, unwittingly, gives "the house on July Street to
B." While it could be argued that the later disposition simply prevails over the
former and the house belongs to B,36 such a conclusion would effectively read
Article 1708 out of the Civil Code.
But this is not really the point of the present observation. If it is intended
that the concept expressed in present Article 1708 is to be, superseded by the

34. Overruling Lambert would seem to place our law much closer to the presumed intent of a
testator, which is where it is supposed to be in a case ofambiguity. Ifa testator has taken the trouble
to link A and B with a given asset and has simply added "share and share alike" to the disposition,
is it not more likely that he would want the survivor of A or B to have it rather than a universal
legatee or an intestate heir?
35. There is also areference in comment (b) to proposed Article 1588 that probably needs correcting.
The comment notes that much of the harshness of the Lambert rule is alleviated by the substance of
proposed Article 1588 and by the "coordinating provisions ofArticle 1587." But proposed Article 1587
is the "definition" of a particular legacy and seems to have nothing to do with Lambert.
36. Present Article 1723 would appear to indicate this result: "When a person had ordered two
things, which are contradictory, that which is last written is presumed to be the will of the testator,
in which he has persevered, and a derogation to what has before been written to the contrary." There
do not appear to be any decisions squarely on point. The substance of present Article 1723 is
continued in'proposed Article 1615: "When a testament contains contradictory provisions, the one
written last prevails .. " The concept of "written last" has much more meaning in the context of
an olographic testament than it does in a statutory testament, however.
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interpretive rule contained in present Article 1723 (and proposed Article 1615),
then some note should be taken of that intent in a comment.
IV. LAPSE OF LEGACIES
Proposed Article 1589 commendably gathers together various instances of
the lapse of legacies which are scattered through multiple articles in the present
Civil Code.37 They are for the most part unremarkable, except for one
observation with respect to terminology. As the proposed article uses the term,
"lapse" apparently describes the situation in which a legacy that the testator
intended to be paid to a given person may not now legally be paid. The reasons
for which it may not now be paid may vary. The most common situation is also
the clearest: the legatee has predeceased the testator. That legacy, at least
insofar as the testator's intent is concerned, must be considered to have "lapsed,"
and the law must oversee its disposition in some other way. But the legacy may
also "lapse" because it is renounced, and under other proposed articles it would
belong to certain designated heirs of the renouncing legatee.3t
In this latter instance, it could be argued that the legacy does not so much
"lapse" as it is redirected by the law; but this is probably more precision than is
required. The common understanding among lawyers of the concept of "lapse"
is that the legacy is, for whatever reason, not going to be paid to the intended
legatee. This common understanding appears to be carried out in the use of the
term "lapse" in the proposed article.
The more important change in the proposed articles, however, occurs in the
subsequent discussion of what is to become of lapsed legacies. Some of the
principles contained in this portion of the proposed articles are to be re-enacted
from the present Civil Code without change. As in present Article 1704 of the
Civil Code, proposed Article 1591 provides that if a particular or general (by
universal title) legacy is made but another particular legacy is "carved out of' the
first legacy but then lapses, the particular or general legacy benefits from the
lapse of that legacy. The proposed article might possibly go a step beyond that,
however, by addressing the lapse of a general legacy as well. 9 And as in

37. Paraphrasing, proposed Article 1589 announces that legacies lapse when the legatee
predeceases the testator or is "incapable of receiving" at the death of the testator; when the legacy
is subject to a suspensive condition and the condition can no longer be fulfilled or the legatee has
died before it is fulfilled; when the legatee is "judicially divested" of his rights in the estate,
presumably by being declared unworthy; when the legacy is renounced; and when the legacy is
declared invalid or null.
38. See supra note 32 and the accompanying text.
39. The proposed article may not necessarily solve all problems. If the testator leaves his
movable property to A and the rest ofhis property to B, the former bequest is a general legacy under
the proposed articles. The precise classification of the legacy to B is not entirely clear. If it is
considered to be a legacy of all of the testator's immovable property (which is logical, since all of
his movable property was given to A and the "rest" is given to B), then presumably it, too, is a
general legacy. But it could also be considered a residuary legacy under proposed Article 1585. But
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present Article 1707, proposed Article 1592 provides that when a legacy to a
joint legatee lapses, it is paid proportionately to the other joint legatees.'
But apart from these well-established rules, there are certain changes.
Generations of lawyers have learned that "representation does not apply to
legacies," meaning that despite what the lay person might expect, a legacy which
lapses does not automatically belong to the representatives of the legatee. If a
person wants that result upon the lapse of a legacy under the present Civil Code
articles, she must provide specifically for it. The proposed articles establish an
"anti-lapse" concept such as that known to our common law brethren, although
limited to certain members ofthe legatee's family. Specifically, proposed Article
1593 provides:
If a legatee, joint or otherwise, is a child or sibling of the testator,
or a descendant of a child or sibling of the testator, then to the extent
that the legatee's interest in the legacy lapses, accretion takes place in
favor of his descendants by roots in existence at the time of the
decedent's death. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to a
legacy that is declared invalid or is declared null for fraud, duress, or
undue influence.
This proposal establishes, as its comments suggest at one point, an implied
vulgar substitution in favor of certain preferred successors. This provision has a
good deal to recommend it, but it is not free of controversy. It is not limited to a
particular type of legacy, so one has to assume that it applies to all types of
legacies. This gives it a broad application which might possibly be more than the
ordinary practitioner or ordinary citizen might expect. There is no question that it
favors certain classes of successors (children and siblings of the legatee, and their
descendants) over others (residuary legatees). On balance, this is probably what
most testators would prefer, if asked; but there is really no practical way to know
that. It is commendable that the provision stays with the current rules of representation, i.e., permits this limited form of representation for legacies to the same
classes ofheirs (children and siblings ofthe legatee, or their descendants) who are
presently permitted the privilege ofrepresentation in intestacy.4' Presumably, the
same rules of representation that are applicable in intestacy to these classes will
also apply in this instance;4 2 a comment to this effect might be helpful.

if A predeceases the testator and the general legacy to A thus lapses, to whom does it belong?
Apparently it would belong to B, since he was given the "rest" of the property, and is presumably
the "successor who would have received the thing if the lapsed legacy had not been made" under
proposed Article 1591. This is an anomalous result if the testator really intended the legacy to B to
be one of all of his immovable property, since he seemed to intend to deny movable property to B,
who then ends up with it under the tenets of proposed Article 1591.
40. The same principle is expressed in almost identical terms in proposed Article 1594.
Presumably this will be corrected when the bill is reintroduced.
41. See La. Civ. Code arts. 882 and 884.
42. Being in the direct line of descendants, children clearly exclude collaterals in intestacy, and
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Several comments under the article clarify specific issues. If the joint legacy
is residuary in nature, the rights to which these preferred successors succeed
upon the death of one of the legatees include not only ownership of the thing
bequeathed, but also the rights of the deceased residuary joint legatee to take
legacies that lapse for whatever reason."3 If the legacy in question is deemed
"invalid" for substantive reasons (for example, if it is a prohibited substitution),
then the exception does not apply and the legacy will descend to a residuary
legatee or in intestacy; but a comment declares that if the legatee is "judicially
divested of his rights" through a declaration of unworthiness, then the exception
does apply." This is an interesting observation; it highlights a curious
dichotomy in the proposed article. If the interest of one of the joint legatees
"lapses" because of fraud, duress, or undue influence (that is, arguably for "bad"
conduct on the part of the legatee), then the preferred successors do not succeed.
The legacy presumably goes to the residuary legatee or in intestacy. But if the
legatee's behavior, while still "bad," becomes the basis for judicial divesting on
the basis of unworthiness, the exception does apply and the legatee's representatives succeed. The reason for the distinction is unclear.
Other comments are not as clarifying, however. The first two comments
announce that the article changes the law by modifying the rule announced in
Succession of Lambert. This could be misleading to the casual reader. The
"rule" announced in Lambert is not that there is no representation as to legacies;
this had been the "rule" prior to Lambert and remained the "rule" after Lambert.
Rather, the "rule" announced in Lambert is that the phrase "share and share
alike" added to a legacy destroys the conjointness of a legacy to two or more
persons, resulting in a conclusion that the legacy lapses rather than accretes to
the putative conjoint legatee or legatees. In fact, this "rule" is not changed by
proposed Article 1593. All that proposed Article 1593 does, which is significant
enough, is to declare that upon the "lapse" of certain legacies (whether because
"share and share alike" is used or for some other reason), a limited privilege of
representation is to be allowed. The comment should probably be reworded to
delete the reference to Lambert as unnecessary, and to some extent misleading.
This brings to the fore another issue. A significant amount of education of
the practicing bar will have to take place with respect to proposed Article 1593.
Not only is this a change of longstanding principles (although probably for the
better), but it is on an issue that will require affirmative action in testaments to
negate its effects. If, for example, a given testator may prefer the old rule and
does not wish a lapsed legacy to go to certain preferred successors, he will have
to provide for that eventuality in the testament. Drafters of testaments will have
to be thoroughly informed of the tenets of proposed Article 1593 so that they can
their representatives would do likewise. Though representation of siblings of the deceased is
permitted in intestacy, those representatives would inherit only when there are no children living or
represented who would exclude them.
43. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1593 cmt. c.
44. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1593 cmt. f.
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take the necessary steps to assure that a testator's wishes are accurately reflected
in the testament.
Subsequent provisions in this same section are superficially appealing, but
may have some unexpected problems. Proposed Article 1596 expresses the longestablished proposition that if any portion of the estate is not disposed of by
legacy, or by accretion in the event of the lapse of this legacy, it descends
intestate. Currently, one would state the rule as "if there is a universal legatee,
then no part of the estate will descend intestate." Because of the change in the
characterization of legacies, and the replacement of "universal legacies" with
"residuary legacies" in the proposal, the comment to proposed Article 1596 states
the proposition as: "Ifthere is a surviving residuary legatee, no portion of the
estate will devolve under this Article." Aside from the general observation that
perhaps the replacement of the concept of "universal legacy" with "residuary
legacy" is questionable, there is nothing remarkable about the essential
proposition expressed in proposed Article 1596.
But the provisions of proposed Article 1595 may be another matter.
Proposed Article 1595 provides: "All legacies that lapse, and are not disposed
of under Article 965 or the preceding Articles, accrete ratably to the residuary
legatees." 45
It is here that the difference between the present category of "universal
legacy" and the proposed category of "residuary legacy" is most prominent. In
theory, at least, a universal legacy is taken as expressive of the testator's intent
to favor the universal legatee with an eventual calling to the entire of the estate,
and it is not difficult then to infer that a universal legatee should benefit from the
lapse of any other legacy. But a residuary legacy does not necessarily carry the
same import. The "residuary" legacy, even with the new definition, has much
more to do with the convenience of describing its substance than with the
revelation of an intent by the testator to favor this legatee with all lapsed
legacies.
Under the new definition, a legacy of "three-fourths of my estate to A and
one-fourth to B" is a "residuary" legacy. 6 Assume that A has predeceased the
testator. Under the present law, this legacy would be considered one under
universal title, and the lapsed legacy of three-fourths of the estate would descend
intestate and would not accrete to B. Making the legacy "residuary" under the
new definition, and then providing in proposed Article 1595 that the residuary
legatee takes this lapsed legacy, will yield the opposite result: B will be entitled
to the entirety of the estate. Since the testator has carefully assigned one-fourth
to B, it is difficult to draw this inference from the bequest itself, but that is what
the law will do under proposed Article 1595. This particular problem would
disappear if the old categories of legacies are retained; this disposition would not

45. Proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1595.
46. Proposed Article 1585 provides that a "residuary legacy is a disposition of all or a fraction
of the entire estate ....
"
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be considered "universal," and thus the lapsed portion of the legacy would
descend intestate unless there is a universal legacy elsewhere in the testament.
V. MISCELLANEOUS Topics: Loss; FRUITS; PRIORITY OF PAYMENT;

DISCHARGE

The remaining articles in the revision address a variety of miscellaneous
issues, some more important than others. Proposed Article 1597 expresses
predictably the consequences of destruction of property that is bequeathed, but
the wording could be improved. As presently proposed, the article provides:
The legacy is extinguished if the object of the legacy is lost, extinguished or destroyed. However, the legatee is entitled to any part of the
property that remains and to any uncollected insurance proceeds attributable to the loss, extinction, or destruction, and to the testator's right of
action against any person liable for the loss, extinction, or destruction. 7
In context, this clearly applies only to a particular legacy of a certain object;
it would not make sense for it to apply to a residuary legacy or a general legacy.
Moreover, it clearly envisions loss, extinction or destruction prior to the death
of the testator, so that at the time the will becomes effective, the legacy cannot
be carried out. Some clarification in the text on these points is indicated."8
There is likely to be some confusion about the proposed article's granting
to the intended legatee of the testator's "right of action" against any person who
might be liable for the destruction of the object in question. This is a part of the
so-called "survival action" governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.1,
which provides that such an action "survives" the death of the owner of the
property, but in favor of specifically designated beneficiaries (spouse and
children first, and in their absence parents, and in their absence siblings) or the
succession representative if those beneficiaries do not survive the deceased.
Article 2315.1 does not indicate whether this right is one that the testator may
give to someone other than the designated beneficiaries.
The matter ofsucceeding to the rights of a deceased with respect to property
damage has an interesting history. Prior to 1961, the case law had established
that the right to recover damage to the property of the victim survived only in
favor of the beneficiaries designated by Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 as it
then read.49 But in 1961, as a part of the comprehensive amendments introducing the new Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature amended the article to carve

47. Proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1597.
48. Conunent (d) to proposed Article 1597 confirms that this is the intended application of the
article, but some expression to that effect in the text would probably be preferable.
49. Guidry v. Crowther, 96 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Young v. McCullium, 74 So. 2d
339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Covey v. Marquette Cas. Co., 84 So. 2d 217 (La. App. Orl. 1956).
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out "damages to property" into a separate paragraph and provided that the right
to recover such damages belonged not to the statutorily-designated beneficiaries,
but rather was "inherited by [the decedent's] legal, instituted, or irregular heirs,
subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse." It seems difficult to
avoid the inference from the 1961 amendments that the right to recover damages
to the property of the victim, unlike the right to recover damages for personal
injury, had become a matter of general succession law rather than tort law. The
claim was to be made by the "successors" not the "statutory beneficiaries." Even
though the word "legatee" was not included in the list of persons to receive the
cause of action, such a testate successor would at least fit comfortably within the
group of listed individuals (intestate heirs).
But still later, in 1986, the "survival" provisions of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315 were carved out of that article and, with amendments, were enacted
as present Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.1. Once again, claims for damage
to property were separated from claims for personal injury damages. The latter
"survived," as they always had, to designated beneficiaries." The former also
"survived" to the same beneficiaries, but unlike the claim for personal injury
damages, "survived" to the succession representative even in the absence of the
designated beneficiaries." Thus, as Article 2315.1 presently stands, the right
to bring an action against a person allegedly liable for the destruction of a
particular object owned by the deceased belongs first to the beneficiaries
designated in exclusive order by the statute, or in their absence by the succession
representative. This seems to express a legislative determination that the "tort"
rights of these beneficiaries are to be preferred to the "succession" rights of the
succession representative.5 2 If that is true, the granting of these rights to the
intended legatee is inconsistent with that philosophy. If it is thought that this
right should more properly rest with the intended legatee (which is not at all an
undesirable result), then an amendment to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315(B)
should be made to insert an intended legatee of the object into the mix of
possible plaintiffs before the statutory beneficiaries and the succession representative. This is cumbersome, however, and perhaps the better rule is simply to
excise this concept from proposed Article 1597 altogether, and leave the law as
it is.

50. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1(A).
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1(B). Presumably the differing treatment may be explained by
the fact that the legislature was unwilling to recognize that the damage to familial relationships

beyond those of spouse, children, parents and siblings was significant enough to permit legal action,
but was willing to permit recovery even in their absence for a piece of property with easily
ascertainable value. This left the law in the curious posture of denying any right to recover for
personal injuries to a victim prior to his death to, say, a close cousin who was the succession
representative but the only surviving relative, but permitting recovery for the damage to the
automobile in which the victim was injured.
52. See generally H. Alston Johnson, 1Il,Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery ofLouisiana
Wrongful Death and SurvivalActions, 37 La. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1976).
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Proposed Article 1598 addresses the truly troublesome issue of the right of
legatees to "fruits and products" attributable to the legacy from the date of death.
It begins with the sensible proposition that these "fruits and products" belong to
the legatee but are subject to administration of the succession, if any (as are the
legacies themselves, of course). This is not, however, simply a restatement of
existing law, and the comments do not make that entirely clear. There is a rule
in the present Civil Code which specifies that these fruits belong to a universal
legatee from the day of death, but only if a demand is made for them within a
year. 3 There is apparently no rule at all for legatees under universal title,
though a comment to the proposed article suggests that the French writers
recognize a right similar to that of the universal legatee. 4 And the rule for a
particular legatee in the present Civil Code is precisely the opposite: there is no
fruits of the legacies until a demand for their delivery is made.55
right to tile
The proposed rule changes this concept, but the comments do not make that
clear.
The proposed article then has a very lengthy second paragraph governing the
issue of "fruits" (I.e., interest) of a monetary legacy. It provides first that such
a legacy is an exception to the general rule of a right to fruits from the day of
death, by specifying that there is a one-year "grace period" from death during
which such interest is not due. That period may be extended by court order for
"good cause shown," or the amount of interest to be paid may be established by
court order. Comment (c) suggests that this is to relieve the succession
representative of being an investment advisor, and perhaps this is a good idea.
However, one might inquire why the same treatment should not be accorded to
other legacies, such as rental property, as to which some "management" of the
bequeathed asset might entail negotiation of rental terms that could possibly
include "free rent" (I.e., no fruits during a given period).
Proposed Articles 1600 and 1601 deal with priority of payment among
legacies, and are essentially unremarkable. They continue the present rules found
in Louisiana Civil Code articles 1635 and 1634 respectively, i.e., particular
legacies are to be discharged in preference to all others and among particular
legacies those of a specific item are to be paid in preference to those of
S6
money.

53. La. Civ. Code art. 1608. If no such demand ismade, then the right to the fruits begins only
with the "day ofthe judicial demand, or from the day on which the delivery has been agreed upon."
Cf A.N. Yiannopoulos, Rightsofthe Usufrucuary: Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 La. L.Rev.
668, 676 (1967).
54. See proposed La. Civ. Code art. 1598 cmt. h.
55. See La. Civ. Code art. 1626.
56. Proposed Article 1601 closes with the statement that when a legacy of money is"expressly
declared to be remunerative, itshall be paid inpreference to all other legacies of money." Probably
this is meant to convey the idea that if a legacy of money seems tobe in compensation for a debt
forgiven or for services rendered, it should be paid before others. The choice of the adjective
"remunerative" is probably not wise, however, since this is a term of art defined elsewhere in tie
Civil Code. If only a general "compensatory" nature to the legacy of money is intended, another
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The final articles in this section deal with the discharge of legacies.
Proposed Article 1602 provides that "intestate successors and general and
residuary legatees are personally bound to discharge an unpaid particular legacy,
each in proportion to the part of the estate that he receives." Comment (e) states
that "it should be obvious" that the article applies only where successors have
been put into possession and there are unpaid cash legacies, followed by a
lengthy explanation about why this should be "obvious." The comment is about
ten times longer than the text of the article, so perhaps it is not so "obvious"
after all. But this is not the primary problem with the proposed article.
If proposed Article 1416 (in another portion of the revision) remains as it
is presently proposed, the rule of present Article 1425 that the accepting heirs are
not solidarily bound for the debts of the deceased will be reversed, and solidary
liability of these heirs of the debts will become the rule. If that is true, then
proposed Article 1602 establishes a different concept for the payment of an
unpaid particular legacy, since it specifies that each successor should pay the
legacy "in proportion to the part of the estate that he receives." This inconsistency should be harmonized. The proposed Article 1602 is essentially the same as
present Article 1633; but the change from no solidarity to solidarity in proposed
Article 1416 has created the inconsistency.
With regard to general legacies (formerly legacies by universal title),

proposed Article 1603 provides that "intestate successors and residuary legatees
are obligated to discharge a general legacy, each in proportion to the part of the
estate that he receives." Here again, there is inconsistency with the proposed
concept of solidary liability. But there is a greater difficulty. Under the
proposed classification scheme, a residuary legacy might be one that says simply

"all the rest of my property to Jane" following another disposition that says "all
of my immovable property to Tom." ' Under the literal reading of proposed
Article 1603 the residuary legatee (Jane) is "obligated to discharge" the legacy
to Tom of immovable property, but she has actually only received movable

property herself. As a practical matter, this will not create a problem in an estate
which is under administration, but could cause confusion in one which is not
under administration, or is not proposed to be.
Similarly, the provisions of proposed Article 1604 relative to "limitation of

liability" in the discharge of legacies seem only to be relevant to estates which
are not under administration. An administered estate will have accomplished the
payment of all legacies before the final judgment of possession and discharge of
the succession representative, so the problem of personal responsibility of a
successor for discharge of a legacy will not be presented. But in the case of a

adjective would be better. Actually, on balance, the closing phrases of present Louisiana Civil Code
article 1635, upon which the proposed article is based, are probably preferable.
57. Proposed Article 1585 provides: "A residuary legacy is a disposition of all or a fraction of
the entire estate, or all or a fraction of the balance of the estate that remains after deducting all
general and particular legacies."

A disposition of all immovables is a general legacy, and the

disposition of the "rest" of the estate after that to Jane is a residuary legacy.
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succession which is not under administration, when the rules of discharge of
legacies discussed in the preceding paragraphs will govern, one has to consider
issues of limitation of liability. Proposed Article 1604 introduces a sort of "in
rem" concept, in which the obligation of a successor to discharge a legacy only
extends to the "value of the property of the estate that he receives, valued as of
the time of the receipt." Stated differently, his own patrimony is not exposed to
the claim of a legatee or apparently the claims of other successors who might
have paid the legacy and are now seeking contribution which would exceed the
value of the property received by this successor.5"
The concept envisioned by the proposed article seems sound; it would be
unfair for the legatee charged with discharge of this legacy to diminish his own
patrimony to do so. But the concept rests uneasily with some other parts of the
revision and with the present Civil Code principles, and should be re-examined.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is much to commend the work of the Law Institute to the Louisiana
Legislature, as there has been in many of the proposals that it has made over the
years. But putting aside the minor drafting problems in the text and comments
that can be corrected, this review leaves two important impressions. One
concerns something the Institute proposes; the other concerns something it does
not propose.
What it proposes, ofcourse, is to change the categories of universal legacies,
legacies by universal title and legacies by particular title into residuary legacies,
general legacies and particular legacies. The case for departing from the
traditional categories is not clearly made; the changes made in the scope of these
legacies could probably be made without changing their names and without
radically changing their content.
What the Law Institute does not propose is the outright overruling of
Succession of Lambert, preferring apparently to nibble around the edges of its
holding. This leaves Lambert to cause mischief and is a missed opportunity to
eradicate it as contrary to many decades of Louisiana judicial opinion.
The writer left the work of revising Book IIof the Civil Code to wiser heads
upon departure from full-time teaching in 1984. These comments are offered as

58. It is unclear how this concept fits with the provisions of La. R.S. 9:5011-5016 (1991) relative

to the separation of the patrimonies of the deceased and the successor. Those statutes establish a
species of "grace period" of "three months" during which the patrimonies do not merge, in effect,
and the rights of the creditors of the deceased prime those of the creditors ofthe successor as to the
assets of the deceased, and vice versa. Following the expiration of this three-month period, itwould
appear from these provisions that the liability of the successor is no longer "in rem" but extends to
his entire patrimony. But see also the puzzling provisions of La. R.S. 9:1421 (1991), to the general
effect that all accepting heirs accept under benefit of inventory and do not expose their patrimonies
to the debts of the deceased. On this latter point, see generally Katherine S.Spaht, Developments
inthe Law--Successions, 47 La. L.Rev. 471, 479-84 (1986).
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an outside observer, to be sure; but as one who still shares with the drafters a
common interest in clarity of impression and ease of application with respect to
the Civil Code. In this spirit, these observations are advanced.

